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Abstract 
 When we are confronted with threats, it can quite reasonable for us to escape. However, 
the habitual avoidance of potential threats can interfere with our ability to adaptively engage with 
the environment and it has been associated with the development and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders and with problems regulating emotions (e.g., Aldao et al., 2010; Hayes et al., 1999; 
Hoffman et al., 2012; Roemer et al., 2008). Thus, a critical questions entails identifying the point 
at which avoidance might no longer confer an advantage. I modified a monetary discounting 
paradigm to capture individual differences in how people avoid an impending negative emotional 
experience. I administered a monetary discount paradigm capturing impulsivity and an emotional 
discounting paradigm assessing avoidance.  Undergraduate students (N=177) were asked to: 1) 
make decisions between taking a small amount of money (varying in amount) or taking a chance 
of receiving a larger amount (varying in probability) (monetary discounting) and 2) make 
decisions between watching short disgust-eliciting film clips for certain (varying in length) or 
taking a chance of having to watch a longer film clip (varying in probability) (emotional 
discounting). Larger discounting rates reflected greater impulsivity and avoidance, respectively. 
Discounting rates in the monetary paradigm were linked with more symptoms of generalized 
anxiety disorder, OCD, and social anxiety and with more emotional difficulties. Performance on 
the emotional discounting was not associated with individual difference or with performance on 
the delay discounting paradigm. Future work should 1) examine the links between emotional 
discounting and symptoms in clinical populations, 2) test the link between emotional discounting 
and physiological markers of emotion regulation. 
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Emotion Regulation and Delayed Discounting: The Development of an Emotional 
Discounting Paradigm 
Background 
In the past two decades, there has been a growing interest in understanding the 
mechanisms by which individuals manage – or regulate – their emotions in order to respond to 
environmental demands (e.g., Gross, 1998). In particular, difficulties with emotion regulation 
have been associated with a wide range of mental disorders, ranging from anxiety and depression 
to schizophrenia and personality disorders (e.g., Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; 
Kring & Sloan, 2009). Certain emotion regulation strategies have been found to have negative 
associations with symptoms and have therefore been conceptualized as adaptive (e.g., 
acceptance, cognitive reappraisal). Conversely, other strategies have been shown to have positive 
associations with symptoms and have been described as maladaptive (e.g. avoidance, 
suppression, rumination). Yet, despite the usefulness of such a heuristic, there are many 
instances in which putatively adaptive strategies might be detrimental (e.g., if we reappraise a 
situation to such an extent that we deny important facts). Similarly, there are times in which the 
putatively maladaptive strategies might confer benefits (e.g., suppressing anger at our boss might 
help us receive a better performance review). In other words, the usefulness of a given strategy is 
highly influenced by the contextual factors surrounding its implementation (for a review, see 
Aldao, 2013; Aldao & Christensen, 2015; Bonanno & Burton, 2013). Yet, because modeling 
contextual factors in controlled laboratory settings can be quite challenging, researchers have 
largely abstained from embarking on such endeavors when studying emotion regulation. 
Consequently, the field only has a limited understanding of the process by which maladaptive 
strategies might serve adaptive functions and vice versa. In my thesis, I address this limitation in 
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the literature by developing a paradigm that allows me to identify the turning point in which the 
use of a maladaptive strategy (avoidance) might become beneficial. Specifically, I developed a 
modified delayed discounting paradigm in which I evaluated individual differences in the costs 
and benefits of avoiding emotions and how these differences, in turn, relate to psychopathology 
and emotion regulation skills. 
What is Delayed Discounting?   
Imagine being a child sitting at a table in a room by yourself, with a delicious 
marshmallow in front of you. Now imagine being told that if you wait until an adult comes back, 
you will get a second marshmallow, but if you eat the first before they return, that is all you get. 
This “marshmallow experiment” (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972) marked the beginning of the 
study of people’s ability to delay an immediate gratification for the sake of obtaining a larger 
reward later. Being able to wait for the second marshmallow has been associated with a wide 
range of beneficial outcomes later in life, including improved academic performance and lower 
rates of psychopathology (e.g., Mischel, et al., 2011). More recently, the marshmallow paradigm 
has been adapted to the study of delayed gratification in adults. Specifically, the delayed 
discounting paradigm captures the process by which people prefer a small reward in the present 
over larger reward in the future (e.g., accepting $2 now instead of $10 in a week). In other 
words, it reflects the extent to which people discount the value of a future reward as the wait 
time increases (e.g., Myerson & Green, 1995). Pertinent to this investigation, larger discounting 
rates (i.e., preferring smaller rewards in the present) have been associated with various mental 
disorders, including substance abuse (e.g., alcohol; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & De Wit, 1999; 
smoking; Reynolds, Richards, Horn, & Karraker, 2004), attention deficit hyperactive disorder 
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(ADHD; e.g., Scheres et al., 2005), schizophrenia (e.g., Wing, Moss, Rabin, & George, 2011), 
and social anxiety (e.g., Rounds, Beck, & Grant, 2007).  
In a monetary delayed discounting paradigm, participants are presented with a series of 
choices between receiving a reward now or a much larger reward later. The amount of the 
current reward and the duration of the delay are systematically varied whereas the amount of the 
delayed reward is held constant. For each delay, participants choose between each of the 
available rewards now versus a fixed reward later. The smallest value of a reward the participant 
is willing to obtain in the moment is referred to as the “indifference point” and it represents 
participants’ subjective value of the delayed reward. After researchers identify an indifference 
point for each of the delays, they can plot a discount function: the indifference points are plotted 
on the Y-axis against the delays, which are plotted on the X-axis in ascending order. Steeper 
curves represent that, at each possible delay, participants are more willing to take the lower 
amount of money now rather than wait for the larger reward later. In other words, they are more 
likely to discount the subjective value of future rewards as the delay increases. While there are 
several different ways to calculate discounting rates from these curves, hyperbolic functions have 
been shown to be the best predictors (e.g., Myerson & Green, 1995), and therefore, is the method 
I used in this thesis. 
 A variant of delayed discounting is probability discounting. In this case, instead of 
choosing between a greater reward in the future versus a smaller reward in the present, 
participants are presented with a choice of a certain but small reward versus an uncertain but 
larger reward (e.g., receive $2 for certain versus taking a 30% chance of receiving $10). Thus, 
larger rates of probability discounting capture participants’ preferences for certainty over 
uncertainty – even when uncertain options might be more beneficial for them. Probability 
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discounting paradigms are particularly well suited for investigations in which it is conceptually 
or methodologically not feasible to deliver the reward at a later point. For that reason, a 
probability discounting paradigm constituted the basis of my paradigm. 
What is Emotional Discounting? 
In addition to experiencing difficulties waiting for delayed rewards, people also have a 
tendency to postpone the experience of negative emotions (e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
1999). This propensity is not intrinsically maladaptive; sometimes avoidance can be useful, as 
when it allows us to not get caught up in difficult emotions and carry on with a particular task. 
Indeed, having flexibility in the use of avoidance (and other strategies) might be key to a healthy 
emotional life (e.g., Hayes et al., 1999; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Yet, many individuals end 
up relying on avoidance chronically and inflexibly and consequently experience difficulties 
regulating their emotions. Moreover, such patterns of inflexible avoidance have been associated 
with the development and maintenance of various forms of psychopathology, in particularly 
anxiety disorders (e.g., Hayes et al., 1999; Mennin & Fresco, 2009; Roemer, Orsillo, & Salters-
Pedneault, 2008). Thus, I developed a laboratory paradigm that allows me to delineate the point 
at which the benefits of avoidance no longer outweigh its costs.  
 I conceptualized emotional discounting as the process by which people discount the 
benefits of avoidance. In other words, it reflects the rate at which individuals are willing to let go 
of their natural tendency to avoid their emotions because the costs of doing so have become too 
high. In my task, I presented participants with two choices: 1) experience a certain but shorter 
negative emotion; versus 2) experience an uncertain but longer negative emotion. Insofar as the 
uncertain but longer emotion has a low probability of occurring, it is beneficial to choose it (i.e., 
avoid the certain but shorter negative emotion). Yet, as the probability of having to experience a 
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negative emotion increases, it becomes less and less beneficial to select it over the certain but 
shorter emotion. In other words, participants might be better off adopting a “bandaid” approach 
and experiencing a certain but short negative emotion rather than placing a bet that might lead 
them to experience a prolonged negative emotion. Grater rates of emotional discounting will be 
indicative of a person being more sensitive to the moment in which avoidance might no longer 
be beneficial.  
Of note, I based my paradigm on a probability discounting paradigm, rather than a delay 
discounting paradigm because with a delay discounting paradigm, participants might be 
motivated to choose the longer but uncertain and then skip the follow-up session altogether. In 
other words, in such a design, avoiding the short but certain emotion might always be adaptive – 
provided one does not come back to the lab. On the other hand, with a probability discounting 
paradigm, all participants will have to experience a negative emotion in that very session. Thus, 
the context is presented in such a way that there is a definite point at which avoidance might no 
longer be beneficial.  
Hypotheses 
I expected that participants would vary in their emotional discount rates and that such 
variation would be associated with emotion regulation and psychological well-being. 
Specifically, I hypothesized that the participants who discounted in the monetary task (which 
reflects greater impulsivity) would report higher levels of anxiety and depression, greater use of 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (i.e., rumination and suppression), lower use of 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies (i.e., reappraisal), and more difficulties with emotion 
regulation skills. Similarly, I expected that participants who discounted more in the emotional 
discounting paradigm (which reflects greater avoidance) would also report greater use of 
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maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (i.e., rumination and suppression), lower use of 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies (i.e., reappraisal), more difficulties with emotion 
regulation skills, and higher levels of anxiety and depression. Also, I expected a minor 
correlation between the two tasks, showing that the tasks were related, but tapping into separate 
processes. 
Method 
I ran this study in Dr. Amelia Aldao’s Psychopathology and Affective Sciences (PAS) lab 
and I was responsible for setting up the task, coordinating participant recruitments, training 
research assistants on the study protocol, cleaning and analyzing data, and writing up the 
findings. I recruited 177 undergraduate participants via flyers posted around campus. However, 
after data analysis, I excluded participants for a variety of reasons (e.g., missing data, extreme 
values (i.e., k higher than 9.7 in the monetary discounting task, and k higher than 4 in the 
emotional discounting task), failure to follow directions), resulting in a final sample of 129. They 
participated in a 2-hour study and received fifteen dollars for their participation. Participants 
arrived at the lab where one of the RAs walked them through the informed consent procedures. I 
then administered a series of self-report questionnaires on Qualtrics. 
Individual Differences in Anxiety and Depression   
  Generalized Anxiety Disorders Questionnaire – IV (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 
2002). The GAD-Q-IV is a 9-item self-report measure that assesses symptoms of GAD. Five 
items are dichotomous and measure the excessiveness and uncontrollability of worry, one item is 
open-ended and asks for a list of the most frequent worry topics, two items on a 9-point scale 
measure the clinical distress and functional impairment associated with excessive worry and 
anxiety, and a final item asks about the presence of the each of the six physical symptoms 
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outlined in the DSM-IV criteria for GAD. Total scores range from 0 to 13 and a clinical cutoff of 
5.7 has been identified (e.g., Newman et al., 2002). The GAD-Q-IV has shown good concurrent 
validity, test-retest reliability, and the ability to differentiate individuals with clinical and non-
clinical levels of GAD (e.g., Newman et al., 2002).  
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). The SIAS is a 20-
item self-report inventory that assesses symptoms of social anxiety disorder, particularly anxiety 
experienced in dyads or groups. Items are scored on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 to 4 and total 
scores range from 0 to 80. A score of 34 has been identified as a clinical cutoff score (Brown et 
al., 1997). The SIAS has demonstrated excellent internal reliability in both clinical and 
undergraduate samples (α’s > .89; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
Social Phobia Scale (SPS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). The SPS is a 20-item self-report 
inventory that assesses symptoms of social anxiety disorder, particularly fears of being observed 
by others (e.g., public speaking, eating in public). As with the SIAS, items are scored on a 5-
point scale ranging from 0 to 4 and total scores range from 0 to 80. A score of 24 has been 
identified as a clinical cutoff score (Brown et al., 1997). The SPS has demonstrated excellent 
internal reliability in both clinical and undergraduate samples (α’s > .89; Mattick & Clarke, 
1998). 
 Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). The OCI-R is 
an 18-item self-report measure that assesses symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder over the 
past month. It has 6 subscales (Washing, Checking, Obsessing, Ordering, Neutralizing, 
Hoarding). It has shown excellent internal consistency (α’s > .83; Foa et al., 2002). 
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson et al., 1995). The 
MASQ (Watson et al. 1995) is a 62-item measure that assesses symptoms that commonly occur 
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in anxiety and mood disorders. The Anxious Arousal subscale consists of 17 items that assess 
anxiety-specific symptoms and the Anhedonic Depression subscale includes 22 items that assess 
symptoms specific to depression. The item assessing suicidal ideation was not included. Watson 
and colleagues (1995) reported good internal reliability in multiple samples (all α’s greater than 
.78). 
Individual Differences in Emotion Regulation 
 Strategies. Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004). The AAQ 
is a 9-item measure of experiential avoidance, and was used to assess the maladaptive strategy of 
avoidance. This measure has been shown to have adequate internal consistency (α = .70) and 
adequate convergence with other measures of emotion regulation (Hayes et al., 2004). 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). The ERQ measures 
the habitual use of two emotion regulation strategies: the adaptive strategy of cognitive 
reappraisal (6 items) and the maladaptive strategy of expressive suppression (4 items). It has 
been extensively used in the literature on emotion regulation and has been shown to have good to 
very good internal consistency (α’s for reappraisal > .75; α’s for expressive suppression > .68; 
Gross & John, 2003). 
Skills. Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). 
The DERS is a 36-item measure that assesses habitual difficulties regulating emotions on several 
dimensions. Items are rated on 5-point scales with higher scores indicating greater difficulties 
regulating emotions. The DERS can be calculated as a total score or as 6 individual subscales 
(i.e., Nonacceptance of Emotional Responses, Difficulties Engaging in Goal Directed Behavior, 
Impulse Control Difficulties, Lack of Emotional Awareness, Limited Access to Emotion 
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Regulation Strategies, and Lack of Emotional Clarity). The DERS total score and the subscales 
have shown very good internal consistency (α’s > .84; Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  
Discounting Tasks 
 The monetary discounting task assessed the extent to which they preferred a smaller 
reward for certain (ranging from $1 to $9) or take a chance (5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95%) of 
obtaining a larger reward ($10). In the emotional discounting task, participants had to choose 
between watching a disgust eliciting film clip for certain (ranging from 1 to 9 minutes) or take a 
chance (5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95%) of having to watch a 10-minute long film clip. I programed 
both tasks on Medialab. The participants then completed a picture task in which they are shown 
various pictures of different levels of disgust. This task was used for a second researcher’s 
project and had no expected consequences on my project of interest. 
From the discounting tasks, I calculated a single value to determine the level of 
impulsivity (for the monetary discounting) or level of avoidance (for the emotional discounting). 
This value was labeled k, and stood for the hyperbolic function that would be required to create a 
curve for that participants indifference points at each probability level. The indifference point 
was calculated by finding the point in the task in which the participant would switch between 
taking the chance of a larger amount to taking the for sure smaller amount for the monetary task. 
In this task, I coded the indifference point as the highest amount that the participant would take 
for sure. For the emotional discounting, the indifference point was coded for when the participant 
switched from taking the smaller video length to taking the chance at having to watch a longer 
video. In this task, the indifference point was coded at the lowest length where the switch 
occurred. These values were then ran through an excel spreadsheet that would calculate the k 
value for the participant (Reed et al., 2012). The higher k value for the monetary discounting 
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indicated higher levels of impulsivity, while higher k values for the emotional discounting 
indicated higher levels of avoidance. The k value was calculated for each participant based upon 
the indifference points at the percentage values of 95%, 75%, 50%, 25%, and 5%. 
Results 
 In order to test my hypotheses, I used SPSS to test both the correlations between the tasks 
and the self-report measures. First, the monetary discounting was significantly correlated with 
GADQ (r = .233; p < .05), SPS (r = .217; p < .05), OCI checking subscale (r = .273; p < .05), 
Anxiety Symptoms (r = .204; p < .05), DERS Awareness subscale (r = -.197; p < .05), and 
DERS Strategies subscale (r = .176; p < .05). Conversely, the relationships between the 
emotional discounting and the self-report questionnaires were not significant (see Tables 1 and 
2). The two discounting tasks were found to have no significant correlation between them (p = 
.20). 
Table 1. Monetary Discounting Paradigm Correlations 
Self-Report Measure r 
GADQ No Skipout .233** 
GADQ Skipout .227* 
SIAS Total .171 
SPS Total .217* 
OCI Checking Subscale .273** 
OCI Hoarding Subscale .032 
OCI Neutralizing Subscale -.023 
OCI Obsessing Subscale .099 
OCI Ordering Subscale .092 
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OCI Washing Subscale -.154 
OCI Total .123 
MASQ AA Subscale -.075 
MASQ Depression Subscale .115 
AAQ Total .081 
Anxiety Symptoms .204* 
ERQ Reappraisal Subscale -.043 
ERQ Suppression Subscale .024 
DERS Awareness Subscale -.197* 
DERS Clarity Subscale -.017 
DERS Goals Subscale .103 
DERS Impulse Subscale .041 
DERS Non-acceptance 
Subscale 
-.017 
DERS Strategies Subscale .176* 
DERS Total .042 
p values less than .05 are denoted with *; p values less than .01 are denoted with ** 
Table 2. Emotional Discounting Paradigm Correlations 
Self-Report Measure r 
GADQ No Skipout .062 
GADQ Skipout .084 
SIAS Total -.040 
SPS Total .164 
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OCI Checking Subscale -.135 
OCI Hoarding Subscale .080 
OCI Neutralizing Subscale .011 
OCI Obsessing Subscale .076 
OCI Ordering Subscale .046 
OCI Washing Subscale -.022 
OCI Total .018 
MASQ AA Subscale .122 
MASQ Depression Subscale .084 
AAQ Total .111 
Anxiety Symptoms .100 
ERQ Reappraisal Subscale .078 
ERQ Suppression Subscale .005 
DERS Awareness Subscale .033 
DERS Clarity Subscale .100 
DERS Goals Subscale .086 
DERS Impulse Subscale -.014 
DERS Non-acceptance 
Subscale 
.107 
DERS Strategies Subscale .149 
DERS Total .118 
p values less than .05 denoted with *; p values less than .01 denoted with ** 
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Discussion 
The results from this study shed more light onto the relationship between discounting 
behavior, symptoms of anxiety and mood disorders, use of emotion regulation strategies, and the 
presence of emotion regulation skills. First, the monetary discounting paradigm was correlated 
with symptoms of GAD, OCD, and social anxiety, and low levels of emotional awareness. Such 
findings extend the literature on impulsivity by suggesting that it might play a role across a 
number of anxiety disorders. For example, people with GAD might impulsively respond do their 
anxiety by engaging in worry, people with social anxiety may impulsively respond to 
overwhelming situations by leaving, and people with OCD may lose control and engage in 
compulsions more frequently due to their impulsivity. Similarly, people with difficulties 
identifying their emotion might be more likely to react impulsively in the face of intense 
feelings. In all, these findings are aligned with the transdiagnostic approach to psychopathology, 
suggesting that dysfunctional processes are implicated in a number of different disorders (e.g., 
impulsivity is a problem in both substance abuse issues and also anxiety disorders) (see Aldao et 
al., 2010; Kring & Sloan, 2010). In this respect, it will be important to recruit clinical samples in 
order to evaluate the extent to which these associations are disorder-specific versus 
transdiagnostic (e.g., Kring & Sloan, 2010). 
It should be noted that the new paradigm for emotional discounting was not correlated 
with any of the self-report measures that were administered. There are a few possible 
interpretations for these null findings. One possibility is the task in its current form does not 
appropriately capture the construct of avoidance as was originally hypothesized. This could be 
due to the risk/reward nature of the paradigm. While I conceptualized the task as a way to 
capture avoidance when the participant decided to take a chance of watching the longer video in 
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order to avoid the emotion altogether. However, participants could have chosen the chance due 
to the thrill of taking a risk. 
Another interpretation is that the videos used were not disgusting enough to elicit strong 
emotionality – and thus, a need for avoidance. A possible explanation for this could be the fact 
that the videos used were taken from the television show Fear Factor. While the clips are 
disgusting, they are not from a tested source that is shown to elicit disgust across multiple 
participants. Also, some people may have watched the show for fun, and therefore, the disgust of 
the videos could be overridden by the enjoyment of the show from a background knowledge that 
the participant brought into the study with them. Future versions of this task could modify the 
stimulus for disgust by finding a normalized disgust eliciting video or using some other stimulus 
that has been experimentally tested to elicit disgust in a majority of participants. 
It is also possible that participants might have been motivated more by the factor of time 
as opposed to the emotional images. In other words, the participant may have selected the 
probability chance due to the hope of saving time as opposed to avoiding disgust. If this were the 
case, the task may have tapped into time management more so than into avoidance. Lastly, it is 
feasible that because I utilized an unselected undergraduate sample, there might have been a 
restriction of range in performance on the emotional discounting as well as on the self-reports of 
emotion regulation and symptoms that might have prevented me from detect important 
differences. In this respect, it will be very important for future studies to test this paradigm in 
individuals experiencing substantial emotion regulation difficulties and/or suffering from clinical 
levels of anxiety and depression. 
This study had a number of limitations that warrant further discussion. First, I tested 
cross-sectional associations. It will be important for future research to evaluate the longitudinal 
DELAYED DISCOUNTING AND EMOTION REGULATION
  17 
 
associations between discounting behavior (both monetary and emotional) and mental disorders. 
Another possible direction for future direction of research off this task would be to run more 
participants through the emotional discounting paradigm to determine if the task can be found to 
correlate with other symptoms of psychopathology or if other regulation strategies (e.g., 
rumination, worry) are linked to avoidance 
In conclusion, the findings from the study suggest that impulsivity might be a 
transdiagnostic factor cutting cross anxiety disorders, in particular GAD, OCD, and social 
anxiety disorder. In addition, impulsivity was associated with lower emotional awareness, thus 
suggesting that it might be linked with core emotion regulation deficits. However, further work 
remains to be done in terms of refining the emotional discounting paradigm in order to reflect 
patterns of avoidance.  Hopefully future work will be able to better delineate the link between 
impulsivity and avoidance in relation to mental health and emotion regulation. 
  
DELAYED DISCOUNTING AND EMOTION REGULATION
  18 
 
References 
Aldao, A. (in press). The future of emotion regulation research: Capturing context. Perspectives 
on Psychological Science. 
Aldao, A., Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Schweizer, S. (2010). Emotion regulation strategies across 
psychopathology: A meta-analysis. Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 217-237.  
Appelhans, B. M., & Luecken, L. J. (2006). Heart rate variability as an index of regulated 
emotional responding. Review of General Psychology, 10, 229-240. 
Brown, E. J., Turovsky, J., Heimburg, R. G., Juster, H. R., Brown, T. A., & Barlow, D. H. 
(1997). Validation of the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale and the Social Phobia Scale 
Across the Anxiety Disorders. Psychological Assessment, 9, 21-27. 
Foa, E. B., Huppert, J. D., Leiberg, S., Langner, R., Kichic, R., Hajcak, G., & Saalkovskis, P. M. 
(2002). The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory: Development and validation of a short 
version. Psychological Assessment, 14, 485-496. 
Freeston, M. H., Rheaume, J., Letarte, H., Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (1994). Why do people 
worry? Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 791–802. 
Gratz, K. L., & Roemer, L. (2004). Multidimensional assessment of emotion regulation and 
dysregulation: Development, factor structure, and initial validation of the difficulties in 
emotion regulation scale. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 26, 
41-54.  
Gross, J. J. (1998). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review. Review of 
General Psychology, 2, 271-299.  
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: 
Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social 
DELAYED DISCOUNTING AND EMOTION REGULATION
  19 
 
Psychology, 85, 348-362. 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and commitment therapy: An 
experiential approach to behavior change. New York: Guilford Press. 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., Wilson, K. G., Bissett, R. T., Pistorello, J., Toarmino, D., et al. 
(2004). Measuring experiential avoidance: A preliminary test of a working model. The 
Psychological Record, 54, 553−578. 
Kashdan, T. B., & Rottenberg, J. (2010). Psychological flexibility as a fundamental aspect of 
health. Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 865-878.  
Kring, A. M., & Sloan, D. S. (2009). Emotion Regulation and Psychopathology. New York: 
Guilford Press.  
Mattick, R. P., & Clarke, J. C. (1998). Development and validation of measures of social phobia 
scrutiny fear and social interaction anxiety. Behaviour Research & Therapy, 36, 455–
470.  
Mennin, D., S., & Fresco, D. M. (2009). Emotion regulation as a framework for understanding 
and treating anxiety pathology. In A. M. Kring & D. M. Sloan (Eds.), Emotion regulation 
in psychopathology (pp. 356-379). New York: Guilford Press. 
Mischel, W., Ayduk, O., Bermen, M. G., Casey, B. J., Gotlib, I. H., Jonides, J., …, & Shoda, Y. 
(2011). ‘Willpower’ over the life span: decomposing self-regulation. Social Cognitive & 
Affective Neuroscience, 6, 252-256.  
Mischel, W; Ebbesen, E. B., & Raskoff Zeiss, A. (1972). Cognitive and attentional mechanisms 
in delay of gratification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 204–218.  
Myerson, J., & Green, L. (1995). Discounting of delayed rewards: Models of individual choice. 
Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 64, 253-276. 
DELAYED DISCOUNTING AND EMOTION REGULATION
  20 
 
Newman, M. G., Zuellig, A. R., Kachin, K. E., Constantino, M. J., Przeworski, A., Erickson, T., 
et al. (2002). Preliminary reliability and validity of the generalized anxiety disorder 
questionnaire-IV: a revised self-report diagnostic measure of generalized anxiety 
disorder. Behavior Therapy, 33, 215-233. 
Reed, D. D., Kaplan, B.A., & Brewer, A.T. (2012). A Tutorial on the Use of Excel 2010 and 
Excel for Mac 2011 for Conducting Delay-Discounting Analyses. Journal of Applied 
Behavior Analysis, 45, 375-386. 
Reynolds, B., Richards, J. B., Horn, K., & Karraker, K. (2004). Delay Discounting and 
Probability Discounting as Related to Cigarette Smoking Status in Adults. Behavioural 
Processes, 65, 35-42. 
Richards, J. B., Zhang, L., Mitchell, S. H., & De Wit, H. (1999). Delay or Probability 
Discounting in a Model of Impulsive Behavior: Effect of Alcohol. Journal of the 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, Number 2, 121-143. 
Roemer, L., Orsillo, S. M., & Salters-Pedneault, K. (2008). Efficacy of an Acceptance-Based 
Behavior Therapy for Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Evaluation in a Randomized 
Controlled Trial. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 76, 1083-1089. 
Rounds, J. S., Beck, J. G., & Grant, D. M. (2007). Is the Delay Discounting Paradigm Useful in 
Understanding Social Anxiety? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 729-735. 
Scheres, A., Dijkstra, M., Ainslie, E., Balkan, J., Reynolds, B., Sonuga-Barke, E., & Castellanos, 
F. X. (2005). Temporal and Probabilistic Discounting of Rewards in Children and 
Adolescents: Effects of Age and ADHD Symptoms. Neuropsychologia, 44, 2092-2103. 
Thayer, J. F., Ahn, F., Fredrikson, M., Sollers, J. J., & Wager, T. D. (2012). A meta analysis of 
DELAYED DISCOUNTING AND EMOTION REGULATION
  21 
 
heart rate variability and neuroimaging studies: Implications for heart rate variability as a 
marker of stress and health. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36, 747-756. 
Watson, D., Weber, K., Assenheimer, J. S., Clark, L. A., Strauss, M. E., & McCormick, R. A. 
(1995). Testing a tripartite model: I. Evaluating the convergent and discriminant validity 
of anxiety and depression symptom scales. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104, 3–14.  
Wing, V. C., Moss, T. G., Rabin, R. A., & George, T. P. (2012). Effects of Cigarette Smoking 
Status on Delay Discounting in Schizophrenia and Healthy Controls. Addictive 
Behaviors, 37, 67-72. 
 
